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KEY SPECIFICITIES OF SOCIAL FABRIC UNDER 
NEW-CAPITALISM1
ZSUZSA FERGE2
ABSTRACT: The paper describes manifestations of inequality and poverty evolving 
under new-capitalism in Hungary. The new aspects of inequality include unlimited 
force-fields and unbridled competition between them, new divisions in inequality, 
and the absence of both ceiling and floor. The new features of poverty include 
massive and lasting joblessness leading to the socialization of children in an at-
mosphere of hopelessness, extreme social exclusion turning entire micro-regions 
into poor and Gypsy ghettos, demeaning forms of workfare and the like. 
About half of Hungary’s residents have lost out in the regime change, meaning 
that they are worse off now than before. Roughly half the losers are poor and 
about half a million of them (the entire population of the country is ten million) 
were poor both before and after the change. The new inequality and poverty is a 
challenge to all Hungarians, particularly to politicians and the poor themselves. 
Responses are often distorted because the sudden and extreme occurrence of pov-
erty has spawned a vehement rejection of the poor, often combined with rapidly 
spreading racism. 
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The factors that fundamentally define the fabric of social relations – includ-
ing the structure of resources – have been turned head-over-heels when com-
pared to conditions under state socialism. “The dominant role once played by 
political power in structuring relations has given way to the power of capital 
in a market-run society. It has also split society into the categories of ‘own-
1  This is a somewhat reworked chapter from the book entitled, Társadalmi áramlatok és egyéni 
szerepek (Social flows and individual roles) Napvilág Kiadó, 2010. The manuscript was sub-
mitted in March, before April’s parliamentary elections, so only some references are made to 
the new political situation. 
2  Zsuzsa Ferge is professor  emerita, head of research at the Office of Programmes against Child 
Poverty of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences e-mail address: fergesp@t-online.hu
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ers’ and ‘everyone else’. Nevertheless, there are a wide variety of vertical and 
horizontal links connecting the two halves of the playing field. The change 
in structural relations means that private ownership has become more or less 
dominant while political authority is no longer a decisive factor. The politi-
cal game has become just one factor in the relationships which shape the 
social structure. The types of connection a person has to the labor market 
have become almost as important as ownership of capital as factors reshaping 
society and determining differences in individual opportunity. The two fac-
tors together determine the way a person can access the resources necessary 
for subsistence, the extent to which they may be accessed, and the entitlement 
under which the person may access them” (Ferge 2006). The resulting social 
fabric has several additional specificities when compared to state socialism.
I would like to focus on a single one of these specifics – the nature and im-
pacts of inequality. I am starting to hope that reviving the idea of spotlighting 
inequality is growing into more than just a personal obsession. The demand 
to reduce inequality in schools has already become an international move-
ment that has left a political imprint even on Hungary. In Hungarian public 
education, Equal Opportunity plans and the Integrated Pedagogical System 
were designed to meet this goal. These are mutually supportive tools which, 
if applied on both school and settlement level, give the school (or commu-
nity) a chance to apply for various state subsidies based on the proportion 
of disadvantaged (“HH”) or multiply disadvantaged (“HHH”) children liv-
ing and attending school there3. On an international level it is increasingly 
considered a public responsibility to reduce the social inequalities of decisive 
significance to life expectancy and quality of life (e.g. Marmot Review 2010). 
International research shows that inequalities do more than affect specific 
factors of living. Instead, they take on a life of their own, shaping the quality 
of a given society by preserving and passing on existing hierarchies from one 
generation to the next. This influence is independent of the economic level of 
a given country, or of how poor the poor are, or how affluent the well-to-do 
may be. Social epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson has drawn the conclusion 
based on decades of research that “…people in more unequal societies trust 
each other less, they are less likely to be involved in community life, and rates 
of violence are higher. All suggest that inequality damages the quality of so-
cial relations” (Wilkinson 2005, 2006)4.
The Stiglitz–Sen–Fitoussi Report (2009), which caused such a stir, also un-
3  The labels (HH, HHH) used for positive discrimination may easily become stigmas, a problem 
requiring further research.
4  http://socialbaby.blogspot.com/2006/01/richard-wilkinson-impact-of-inequality.html
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derlined the problem from the angle of economic and social sustainability. 
While the title of the report suggested issues of methodology and measure-
ment, the three prominent economists (two of whom are Nobel laureates) 
pointed out that an outlook which narrowed down development to economic 
growth overlooked the most important aspects of human existence along with 
the whole of quality of life. Poverty plays a defining role in determining qual-
ity of life, but inequality has an even greater impact. Therefore, for example, 
Recommendation 7 of the Report read as follows: “Quality-of-life indicators 
in all the dimensions covered should assess inequalities in a comprehensive 
way”. 
SPECIFICITIES OF NEW INEQUALITIES
The specifics detailed below describe features of new-capitalism in Hun-
gary as compared to the former system. Inequalities are growing in a global 
context, too. I did not study - at this point - whether the specifics here de-
scribed differ from those of other countries.
The possibility of an unlimited number of fields of force
An important new twist to social relations is that there are no dictates com-
ing from above or from the outside to regulate the set-up of the possible fields 
of force. There are no limits on the new economic, service, or similar entities, 
or on the political parties, newspapers or civic organizations that can be es-
tablished. New methods of resolution – the fact that one may resign from an 
institution or may criticize an institution in any style – do have the power to 
mitigate certain conflicts. For instance, if there are conflicts within a political 
party that prove irreconcilable, there is nothing to prevent a split and a new 
party being formed. If there are methodological or other differences of opin-
ion within a service organization such as a school, people can quit and even 
set up a new school. The rise in the number of force fields also generates new 
tensions and triggers dynamic possibilities. This may have two consequences 
as far as social hierarchies are concerned. In one instance, the organizations 
themselves may strive for exclusivity. Their goal is to concentrate people of 
similar social positions, promoting the formation of hierarchies and weaken-
ing ties between groups. But organization proliferation can also reduce com-
petition for the top slots because the more organizations there are, the more 
‘head honchos’ there can be. It is easy to get used to this kind of pluralism. 
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In Hungary for instance, 3,200 mayors enjoy powerful positions of authority, 
rendering competition between the force fields even stiffer. For this reason the 
rise in the number of fields – a product and an advantage of democracy – also 
creates new costs. The costs of democracy – the lengthy process of building 
consensus instead of a single dictatorial decision – are usually high. They also 
require a long time to pay for themselves and it takes even longer before we 
learn that they are actually much more sustainable than are dictates. The pay-
off from the unlimited increase in the number of force fields is shakier. In all 
probability the increase in force fields and corresponding proliferation of “top 
slots” that goes along with it will heighten inequalities in distribution given 
the limited nature of resources. Those people who snare the top slots – heads 
of new institutions and the like – will usually do their best to obtain an income 
befitting their rank, which leaves even less money for the lower echelons. This 
may even appear to be acceptable and legitimate because society is gradually 
getting used to a growing level of inequality as a quasi new norm. 
Unlimited competition 
Not only are an unlimited number of new force fields coming into existence, 
there is nothing to limit competition between them once they do. Unfettered 
competition is obviously going to claim victims on an ongoing basis. De-
pending on our choice of values, we can see this as Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” and an engine of growth, or as a social hazard. Although my anti-
competition views are rather well-known (at least in Hungary; Ferge, 2009), 
I do recognize that global competition exists, which means that Hungary 
cannot ignore or negate it. The usual prescription offered for improving the 
country’s international standing is to improve competitiveness. So, it would 
be nice to clarify what that actually means and what “improvement” depends 
on. Perhaps on getting individuals and businesses to be “competitive”, mean-
ing to compete with each other and drive each other out of business, as many 
people seem to think? Or maybe on how individuals and businesses manage 
to keep an eye on the country’s common goals while making good in the 
business world? Accepting common goals obviously requires compromise 
and designing the compromises means having to cooperate. Quite a number 
of countries have demonstrated that cooperation within their borders boosts 
efficiency and profitability. There is good reason to assume that the interna-
tional competitiveness of the whole of a country and the competitiveness of 
the individuals or the smaller units of the said country – such as businesses, 
local governments, ministries or units within ministries – are not in fact re-
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ally connected. In fact, cutthroat competition between individuals or smaller 
groups can end up being an obstacle to a country’s international competi-
tiveness while a measure of solidarity and cooperation will promote it. The 
economic downturn led to the surfacing of another problem – the fact that 
international competition is not necessarily in the interests of a country. Most 
likely, every single member of the European Union would have profited from 
authorizing the EU to manage the crisis for all of them. Sovereign solutions 
which differed from country to country have become sources of many new 
conflicts. Despite this, increasingly powerful interests are fighting for what 
they call the ideal of individual freedom, meaning that they want to eliminate 
all moral, legal, and political controls and regulations controlling competitive 
institutions. 
Growing inequalities may lead to deeper splits
When the overall amount of resources increases, inequality may increase 
or decrease, and so can poverty. Even rising inequality does not necessarily 
mean that the poor are getting poorer. More specifically, for a long time we 
lived with the economic fable that if the economy grew, growth would even-
tually trickle down to the poor, alleviating poverty, if not necessarily reducing 
inequality. That fable has fallen by the wayside. It can be easily understood 
that if a large part of the profit (with or without financial bubbles) is limited 
to the global money market, none of that is going to trickle down anywhere. 
And if resources are declining, we can be pretty sure that the stronger groups 
will be better able to defend their shares than weaker ones. So, if the stronger 
groups are able to absorb surpluses even when resources are becoming scarce, 
the weaker ones are sure to lose out. The result is that social distances will 
grow and new social splits will come about. 
The following is just a single example of what it boils down to when overall 
improvement and growing inequality lead to new splits. Infant mortality in 
Hungary was quite high for a long time, and it is now starting to drop. But 
people in better social and regional positions can take far better advantage of 
the conditions leading to the decrease. So the situation of people on the poor 
end of the scale keeps going downhill while the ones who are better prepared 
can profit from the new opportunities. A regional breakdown can illustrate the 
inequalities: there was a radical decline in infant mortality in Western Trans-
danubia (Western Hungary) between 2000 and 2007, and the rate now more 
or less corresponds to the EU average. But in the poorest region, Northern 
Hungary, the infant mortality rate has grown significantly (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Infant mortality (Ratio of infants dying before 
their first birthday per 1,000 live births)
Source:  http://www.ksh.hu/rss/indi/2/indi2_8_1.html
There is no ceiling on inequality 
When competition is unlimited, so are the stakes. This is one reason be-
hind the growth in inequalities in both income and assets. Although it is hard 
to monitor inequalities in income statistically, the rise in the luxury housing 
market and in luxury shops is rather conspicuous. Of course truly cutthroat 
competition may lead to the limiting of competition in the long run. In Hun-
gary, the country’s two best-known traditional giant meat processors, Pick 
and Herz, now have a single owner. In other words, the multi-player market, 
which might really be a progressive force, is dying. We do not expect to see 
any regulations whatsoever that set ceilings. For the moment, ceilings only 
come about when forced into existence by competition between or among 
force fields (the government may impose ceilings, for instance, on salaries but 
as the new regulations under preparation in Hungary show, they are limited to 
public-sector managers). 
We are seeing the effects of the lack of a ceiling in other fields than income, 
too. In democracies, giving children equal opportunity to education for at 
least the first 12 to 16 years of their lives is a fundamental principle. However, 
if not all schools are equally good, the upper strata will try to get their children 
into the best of the schools. They use up a large portion of public (central 
and local government) resources to do this. If that fails, then they use private 
monies. This happened in Hungary long before the market appeared on the 
scene. Research done by our group in the early 1970s demonstrated that the 
differentiation of public (government-financed) schools by social classes, or 
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more specifically the expropriation of the better schools by the upper and 
middle classes, existed even then. Yet, the regulations in place at the time, 
which restricted enrolment at a given school to children living in the school 
district, combined with the government’s educational monopoly were power-
ful restrictive forces. Freedom of school choice, introduced in 1985, followed 
by the freedom to establish schools has significantly widened the gap. Inter-
national surveys of school performance (PISA), which have been conducted 
since 2000, show that Hungary is one of the countries with the highest level of 
social discrimination between schools. The between-school variance of chil-
dren’s achievement levels is among the highest of the OECD countries and 
the within-school variance is among the lowest. This discrimination is both 
social and ethnic. The reduction or elimination of ethnic segregation (proba-
bly linked to EU pressure) has become a central goal, both of the government 
and of groups fighting for ethnic rights. Since about 2002, the government 
has been making serious efforts to reduce or eliminate ethnic segregation. 
While this effort may so far have included non-ethnic poor children, to date 
non-ethnic discrimination at the expense of “only” the poor has not managed 
to attract the attention either of the government or of researchers. Income and 
ethnic segregation currently determine to a large extent the unequal educa-
tional performances of Hungarian schools.
There is no floor on inequality either 
The threat of joblessness and poverty first reared its head some 25 years ago, 
and by 1990 or so the picture of what was to come became shockingly clear. 
Nevertheless, the country and the political classes did very little to prepare to 
manage the trouble. The Employment Act of 1991 did offer temporary benefits 
to a sizable portion of the jobless. However, the relatively generous benefits 
and extensive entitlements of those early years have since been cut signifi-
cantly. Sustenance for the poor was never guaranteed. Nevertheless, there has 
been fluctuation. The Social Act, originally adopted in 1993, introduced in the 
mid-nineties an income-substitution support that was not limited in time to 
cover the (frequent) occasions when unemployment benefits of an insurance-
type expired. The government which came after terminated it in 1998, but the 
following government never restored it, so that this support disappeared. The 
level of eligibility for aid has fluctuated over the past 20 years with the on-and-
off introduction of various conditionalities, culminating in 2008 in the “Road 
to Work program” (more on this later). The discretionary power of local au-
thorities is varied. Sometimes they choose freely who they deem worthy of 
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helping, even if the law does not give them that authority. The smaller a set-
tlement, the greater the discretionary power of the mayor in deciding who gets 
how much and in what form (cash or kind). They do not have to worry about 
people protesting either. The Social Act does not assure an individual right of 
appeal, the people on the receiving end have no organized power, and there 
is no professional or legal oversight of local government operations. In 2006, 
public awareness about increasing poverty was growing. The dire poverty re-
sulting from the low level of assistance was somewhat alleviated when the 
uniform amount of social assistance (offered both to long-term unemployed 
and so-called unemployable people) was supplemented so that it took family 
size into consideration. Although basic assistance adjusted to family size is 
the rule rather than the exception in EU member states, the Hungarian govern-
ment gradually repealed this arrangement from 2009 on (in connection with the 
“Road to Work program”). Throughout this time, the need to set a minimum 
income level was not acknowledged either by the Social Act and its amend-
ments or by any other disposition. Instead, rapidly changing and increasingly 
intricate legislation triggered the evolvement of a highly bureaucratic and often 
arbitrary assistance bureaucracy (Szalai, J. 2007). With increasing government 
austerity, the chances of setting such a floor are getting slimmer. 
An oft-repeated demand is for some kind of social housing minimum, at least 
for families with children, to prevent this group – if only this group – from 
becoming homeless. The Parliamentary Commissioners for Civil Rights turned 
to the Constitutional Court, asking that the concept of ‘social minimum’ be in-
terpreted to include the right to housing. The Constitutional Court rejected the 
proposal. Its reasoning was as follows: “Under paragraph (1) of Article 70/E 
of the Constitution, the right to social security includes the provision that the 
state must guarantee a minimum subsistence level through an ensemble of social 
benefits. Specifically defined rights – such as the “right to housing” – cannot 
be derived as a constitutional right from this minimum subsistence guarantee. 
Therefore, in such concrete matters, the obligation of the state and consequently 
its responsibility cannot be determined. Under paragraph (2) of Article 70/E of 
the Constitution the state is mandated to establish, sustain and operate a set of 
social insurance and social welfare institutions to realize the right of citizens to 
subsistence benefits. When establishing the system of social provisions ensur-
ing minimum subsistence, the basic constitutional requirement is to protect hu-
man life and dignity. Consequently the state shall provide the basic conditions 
for human life, and in cases of homelessness it shall arrange for emergency 
accommodation to avert situations that directly threaten human life”. 
Other failed proposals included attempts to prevent utilities from being dis-
connected, at least in households with children. At the same time, however, 
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debt service facilities, a crisis management fund and recent rules on subsi-
dizing the price of district heat and gas have helped some families that have 
found themselves in debt, and have prevented others from ending up in debt. 
Nevertheless, none of this has been able to help people who are deep in debt or 
are very poor. Meanwhile, chances for poor people to improve on substandard 
housing situations have deteriorated. Opportunities to access socially-based 
housing subsidies were terminated in July 2009. Local governments lack the 
funds to build rental housing. Consequently, poor families obviously have no 
chance of upgrading their current homes and young families starting out in 
life are forced to share already overcrowded homes with their elders or live in 
substandard dwellings never meant for human habitation. In short, as of 2009, 
there is no floor on how deep into deprivation people can sink.
NEW POVERTY – WHAT’S NEW ABOUT IT?
The issue of poverty is perhaps the point where the new regime comes out 
worst when compared to state socialism. It is common knowledge that the 
flows that intensified poverty were already manifest in the 1980s, but shifted 
to acceleration mode after 1989. 
Over one million jobs were lost in the early years following 1990. A large 
part of the new unemployed were absorbed by the pension system (causing 
hardship later). Hardest hit were the uneducated, the Gypsies and rural resi-
dents who could never return to the labor market. The unemployment rate 
rose to 10.1 percent by the autumn of 2009 and to 12.8 percent by the spring 
of 2010. Meanwhile only 54 percent of the population was economically ac-
tive, one of the three lowest rates in Europe. As labor law eroded and the 
number of jobs plummeted, existential uncertainty shot up. Among more im-
mediate and well-known consequences (such as deterioration in health) this 
will have major negative repercussions in the future. Of particular concern 
is the socialization of children. In 2007 one-seventh of all children lived in 
households where there was no economically active person; and in many of 
them this has been the case for two or three generations. In 2007 this was 
the second highest proportion in Europe. Given the global crisis the situation 
must have deteriorated in quite a few countries, but in Hungary the downturn 
has been dramatic: in 2009, fully 21 percent of all children under 18, or one 
child in five was living in a family without a single economically active per-
son. “Growing up hopeless” is a new experience.
The cost of home maintenance has increased quite disproportionately com-
pared to income growth. The widening gap has led to massive indebtedness, 
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evictions and homelessness – all new phenomena. In the spring of 2009, fully 
750,000 families (not all of them are poor) were behind on mortgage payments, 
and 260,000 families had unpaid utility bills. The electricity had been switched 
off in 4,000 homes, and the number of families losing their homes and undergo-
ing eviction climbed from a few hundred a year to well over 1,000. After the 
crisis hit evictions multiplied in 2010 (no statistics currently available). 
Many people fled from the cities because of their inability to pay housing 
costs, and the better off cities or parts of cities did everything in their power 
to rid themselves of their poor and their Gypsy residents. The consequence 
is a new type of social exclusion, the “Gypsy ghettoization” of many micro-
regions. More recently, there has been an influx of poor urbanites, including 
families with a larger number of children, to isolated farming communities. 
We have also witnessed a process more typical of Latin America, namely 
the emergence of favelas: shantytowns are evolving along the outskirts of 
larger cities, on abandoned weekend-home plots, or on the grounds of closed 
down factories and mines. Many of these ghettos and shantytowns have no 
internal leadership structures. Residents have no anchors and no prospects of 
improvement. These are hitherto unknown processes in Hungary.
– One of the obvious consequences of these phenomena is an increase in in-
come inequality and poverty. The scale of poverty in Hungary qualifies as av-
erage for Europe, with about 12-13 percent of the population considered poor 
under a uniform European standard. Child poverty, however, is worse than the 
European average (around 25 percent in 2009). After 1990 there was a steep 
rise in income inequality and the proportion of poor people. Around 2007 
it appeared that the rise in income inequality was slowing down. However, 
starting in 2008 the situation again began to deteriorate, partly because of 
the economic downturn and partly because of an indifferent (or malevolent) 
policy towards the poor. The real wages of those retaining their jobs fluctu-
ated with the crisis. In the first two years of the crisis they decreased, and 
since 2009 employee wages have shown minimal growth. Pensioners suffered 
some losses (e.g. because of the new methods of indexing to prices) but they 
are still relatively protected from poverty. The unemployed and those receiv-
ing social benefits got a worse deal. The real value of social benefits, (family 
allowance included), social assistance, and unemployment aid dropped, part-
ly because there has been no nominal increase in the amount distributed since 
2008 and partly because the price index for the very poor rose much more 
steeply than the nationwide average. The crisis has accelerated the process 
of disintegration, and increased inequality, particularly among families with 
children. In 2009, already close to 30 per cent of all children under 18 lived in 
poverty, an unusually high rate.
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Table 1  Poverty rates in the whole population and among children
(All persons in  the given category=100%)
Total population
Persons living in house-
holds with children
Children under 18
2001 13,5 19,9 22,8
2003 13,8 19,4 22,4
2005 13,2 18,1 20,0
2007 12,7 19,0 20,1
2009 16,5 27,3 29,6
Source: 2001–2007:  TÁRKI Household Monitor Surveys, (http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/
hm/index.html). 2009: TÁRKI survey on families with children, 2009
The nature and role of the labor market has fully changed. Decades of full 
employment have been followed all over Europe by labor market difficulties. 
Some – mostly Scandinavian – countries try to maintain the formerly generous 
welfare arrangements combined with new active labor market policies. Others 
move more or less rapidly from “welfare” to “workfare’. The Hungarian “Road 
to Work program” introduced in 2008 seems to be a particularly harsh exam-
ple of the workfare “culture”. The legislation ties receiving the dole to work, 
namely community work. The government shifted responsibility for organizing 
and implementing the program to local governments but the money earmarked 
for this purpose includes very little for equipment, professional planning, or 
organization. So, as experience has shown, the poorer the settlement, the less 
community service it has available and the worse the jobs that it offers. 
The new law (an amendment of the Social Act) separated people receiv-
ing assistance into two groups. Those assumed to be able to work (the large 
majority) went on a list of people “available to work”. Hence the money they 
receive is called “Availability Support”, (abbreviated as RÁT), correspond-
ing to the minimum pension (an arbitrary and very low threshold) and not 
adjusted for family size. The prerequisite for receiving the RÁT is that the 
person must accept whatever public work is offered for at least 90 days a year 
(assuming that any is offered) for pay amounting to the mandatory minimum 
wage. If they refuse it, the sanction is suspension of the RÁT (and all other 
forms of support) for a longer or shorter period of time. The small minority 
deemed unable to work (people over 55, the chronically ill, or women with 
3 or more children not in day-care) continue to get family-size-adjusted as-
sistance. In the first year (2009) families continued to receive the earlier ben-
efits; several RÁT-s if there were several unemployed members, or both RÁT 
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and assistance. From January 2010 the new law has been fully implemented. 
From this point on, one family has a right to only one benefit - that is to only 
one RÁT, whatever the number of unemployed, or to one sum of assistance. 
If there is only one person on RÁT, the family supplement is lost. At the 
same time a more rigorous regulation of clandestine (unregistered) work was 
introduced combined with increased monitoring of compliance: if a person is 
caught working illegally, all aid is terminated. 
The declared goal of the program is helping people to return to the labor 
market. This has proved a failure: only one per cent of those undertaking 
public work have returned to the open labor market. This is understandable. 
The work done locally, which makes no demands on people and requires no 
preparation, does not reinforce any skills that might help them on the open 
labor market. It is not the aid itself that acts as a counter-incentive to so-
cially worthwhile work as economists usually see it, but isolation from real 
social opportunities. The other program goal was to pacify those who were 
set against rights to assistance without obligation to work. Yet the ‘solution’ 
has heightened animosity towards the poor. In some cases this was done by 
spreading the rumor that “all they do all day long is lean on their shovels”, 
while in others it was “they get the same amount as I do”, although I’m work-
ing a whole lot harder. In other words, if the poor people get anything at all, 
whether they work for it or not, society’s opinion leaders qualify it as waste 
and throwing money out the window. 
As a matter of fact, the Road to Work policy rests on contradicting a tenet of 
Roman law. According to this “no one can be required to do the impossible” 
(nemo potest ad impossibile obligari). However, the basis for the demand that 
the poor work is that “anyone who really wants work will find it”. Since this 
is clearly a falsehood, the policies that rest on it are demanding the impos-
sible and are therefore doomed to failure. Meanwhile, the policy significantly 
weakens social rights. 
ARE THE NEW POOR REALLY NEWLY POOR?
Unfortunately, there is no set of data in Hungary that monitors the evolu-
tion of living conditions for individuals, families, and groups as a function of 
time5. Even the retrospective surveys that compare past and present are few in 
number. There were two projects from which I can extract some information. 
5  The Hungarian Household Panel survey that TÁRKI launched in 1992 was terminated after the 
sixth wave in 1998 because of a lack of funding. 
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The SOCO project conducted in 1995 (Ferge et al., 1996) tried to map out the 
regime change’s winners and losers in several ways. Among other things, it 
compared how individuals placed themselves on a 5-point rating scale, where 
they marked their past and current social situations. They also marked their 
incomes for the given year and a time three years earlier along a ten-point 
scale. The ‘winners’ in the Figure are those who placed themselves higher 
on the social or income ladders in 1994 as compared to the 1980s, while the 
“losers” put themselves lower. The survey covered five countries. I will not 
go into detail here, but would mention only that Hungary has the fewest win-
ners and most losers. Polish and Slovak data were similar to ours, while the 
Czechs and Germans qualified the changes as being more favorable than the 
other three countries. One interesting point is that people saw changes in their 
social situations as somewhat less advantageous than changes in their income 
situations (Figures 2a and 2b).
Figure 2a  Distribution of respondents by change in income in 1994, 
compared to 3 years earlier, %*
* The respondents placed themselves on a seven-grade scale representing the income hierarchy in 
the country (seven being the highest and one the lowest grade) for several periods. In this figure 
two placements were compared and regrouped.
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Figure 2b  Distribution of respondents according to change  in their perceived 
social position in 1994 as compared to the eighties, %*
*The respondents placed themselves on a seven-grade scale representing the social status hierar-
chy in the country (seven being the highest and one the lowest grade) for several periods. Here 
the 1980s, and the present (1994) were compared and regrouped. 
Source: SOCO database, Ferge et al., 1996
The perception of being a winner or a loser was related to several factors, 
including occupation, educational level, subjective poverty and the loss of a 
job. On an occupation scale, blue-collar workers had the strongest percep-
tions of loss. Both positive and negative assessments were closely related to 
educational levels (Table 2). 
Table 2  Change of the perceived social position between the 80’s and 1994 (the time 
of the interview) by educational level of the head of household
Max.
primary Vocational Secondary Higher Total
Significant  
deterioration 34 31 23 20 29
Slight 
deterioration 28 29 33 27 30
No change 31 27 29 31 29
Slight 
improvement 5 12 13 18 10
Significant  
improvement 3 1 2 3 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: SOCO database, Ferge et al., 1996
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In the early 1990s, nearly 60 percent of Hungarians qualified themselves 
as losers, five times more than the number of winners. Not all of the losers 
were poor, but there was a strong correlation. Nearly 40 percent of losers and 
20 percent of winners were in the lower income third (tertile), meaning that 
nearly 70 percent of the lower income third said they were losers (Ferge et al, 
1996). In other words, the regime change hurt the people who had also earlier 
a high risk of poverty, namely people with less education, and of course, the 
Roma, more than average 
We do not have the data to continue the story in the same vein. There is, 
however, a TÁRKI research project that is something of a stopgap. In 2007, 
researchers sought out the people for whom they had collected data for the 
first Hungarian Household Panel project in 1992 (Kolosi–Tóth, 2008). The 
outcome was a collection of information on 3,000 people covering a 15-year 
time span. Nearly 60 percent of the people who were poor in 1992 (that is, 
people who assigned themselves in 1992 to the lowest 25 percent when it 
came to income and assets) were in much the same situation in 2007 and only 
7 percent had managed to improve their lot to among the top 25 percent – 
which is a lower ratio than that of the people who managed move upward with 
the regime change (12%). Vice versa, 18 percent of the people in the middle 
group and 9 percent of the people initially in the upper quartile became poor. 
To look at the numbers from a different angle, 56 percent of the people who 
were poor in 2007 (amounting to 14 percent of the population) had been poor 
ever since 1992. The factors we are already aware of – job losses, low educa-
tion level or lack of opportunity in the family, Gypsy ethnicity, and a rural 
residence – were dominant factors in preventing an advance (Figure 3).
It is very difficult to link the two surveys quoted above. I shall still try to 
estimate the proportion of winners and losers in the social and financial sense. 
The winners are not necessarily rich but they are in a stable financial situation 
and have a comparatively high social status. The losers are not necessarily 
poor but their objective situation in life – income, social stature, and level of 
security – has deteriorated compared to 20 years ago. I will not give the de-
tails of my calculations. The only reason I provide the results of my estimate 
at all is because it would be absurd to have no picture whatsoever of these 
two epochal decades. I also want these estimated figures to act as a challenge. 
It would be very useful if other researchers came up with estimates and if we 
were to debate the social rationale of preparing balance sheets of this sort.
Thus, according to my (clearly and admittedly uncertain) assessments:
–  The proportion of losers, meaning people whose positions have deterio-
rated since 1990 and about half of whom are poor, is between 45 and 50 
percent;
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–  About 30 to 35 percent are in the same position as they were before (finan-
cially and socially), although even “no change” can cover major changes 
over the course of 20 years;
–  The proportion of winners, people whose situation has improved and who 
are currently in a good or very good position is about 20 to 25 percent.
Figure 3 Changes in self-positioning on the income-asset ladder 
between 1992 and 2007
Source:  Kolosi-Tóth 2008,  Table 1.9.
The information available is too fragmented for me to even try to come up 
with a precise diagnosis of how many of today’s poor have inherited their 
poverty over the past two or three generations, and how many have only been 
poor for the past 20 years. One part of the question involves who we define 
as poor. The inaccurate estimate given above and the outcomes of a number 
of my own past research projects (Ferge, 2005) encourage me to believe (and 
I would be delighted if it turned out that someone else had better data) that 
if we define the lowest 25 percent of incomes as ‘poor’ (excluding retirees) 
then perhaps one-third of them - equivalent to 7-8 percent of the (non-retired) 
population- come from multi-generational poverty. That amounts to 500,000-
600,000 people. The situation of the others deteriorated later on, and perhaps 
only temporarily. We simply do not know how lasting their poverty is. Based 
on earlier Hungarian data6, which monitored the same people for two to three 
years, and on international data, we can assume that a significant portion of 
6  Shorter follow-up surveys were conducted earlier by the Central Statistical Office and TÁRKI. 
As required by the EU, the Statistical Office is returning to the panel-type method with the 
SILC data survey as of 2008.
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the people who are poor at a given moment in time are only poor for a few 
years, with the poverty triggered by some turning point in their lives such as 
a birth, a death, or a job loss. Meanwhile the inhabitants of the new poor and 
Gypsy ghettoes are likely to have joined the vicious circle of multigenera-
tional poverty. 
RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF GROWING 
INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
How does society see inequality and poverty?
One tragic outcome of the new social system is poverty and even less hope 
of reversing inherited destitution, while another is that with twenty years be-
hind us, society has turned against the poor and the destitute. The process is 
known from world history. If there are only a few poor people, they will re-
ceive social sympathy and assistance, which does not cost too much. If some 
sort of social upset or crisis causes their numbers to grow, supporting them 
becomes more of a social burden. To put it bluntly, they cost more. That leads 
to a gradual decline in social sympathy and willingness to help. When the first 
homeless people came out in public in 1989, humorist and entertainer András 
Nagy Bando and local residents offered them tea and sympathy. Sympathy 
with people who lost their jobs was obvious. Since then things have gone 
downhill. 
The real contradiction in this story is that while inequalities in many coun-
tries continue to grow (with or without government intervention) a significant 
portion of European society has always considered the inequalities to be too 
large and believed it a government task to reduce them (Figure 4).
In this area hardly anything has changed in the past twenty years. The East 
European bloc is taking a slightly stronger stance against inequalities than 
the Western one, but in both blocs anti-inequality feelings predominate and 
variations are significant. The majority of public opinion condemns too much 
inequality. Yet public opinion has never connected inequality with the rise in 
poverty. Political behavior appears to be pretty similarly unable to connect 
the two issues. Thus, people continue to reject inequality while aversion to 
poverty is growing and politics can tout an anti-poor edge.
The ratio of Gypsies is growing among the poor, the extremely poor and 
particularly among young people and families with children (since the Gyp-
sies tend to have a 10-12-year shorter life expectancy than average, their ratio 
within the population as a whole has not shown a particularly significant rise 
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in the last years). Gypsies, unless they are driven out of towns, tend to be 
more visible than non-Gypsies. Beggars and homeless people (for the most 
part non-Gypsies) are also more visible. The non-poor find it nearly impossi-
ble to process this. For a time they tolerated the beggars and the homeless, but 
after a while they found the spectacle disturbing. Psychologically, it became 
a symbol that this could happen to them, too, as well as an accusation – why 
have you let this happen? So local governments passed laws one after the 
other, banning beggars and homeless people from the more affluent parts of 
the towns, or from entering the towns altogether. 
Figure 4 “To what extent should it be the government’s responsibility to reduce 
income differences between the rich and the poor”. (Ratio of answers” definitely 
should be” and “probably should be” as percentage of all respondents in the cell). 
1996 and 2006
Source: ISSP 1996, 2006. (http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-
study-overview/role-of-government/1996/ and same, 2006
How does the world of politics manage poverty?
Political – central and local government – responses to poverty can be good 
or bad. My main point is that policies that do not treat poverty as a structural is-
sue, as a phenomenon related to inequality, that are narrowed down to poverty 
management, are bound to fail. Nevertheless, even a narrowed-down policy 
of poverty management can be better or worse. Despite some unquestionably 
good intentions within Hungarian politics, the overall poverty management 
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policy has many negative features. Some of them are particularly disturbing. 
They include unpredictability, disregarding the facts, frequent ineffectiveness 
and populism. I will illustrate each of these using an example.
Unpredictability. Both rules and outcomes can be unpredictable. The legis-
lative environment is far from stable. The Social Act (Act III., of 1993 on so-
cial welfare administration and social services and benefits) has been amend-
ed 58 times between the time it was adopted and March 2010, meaning nearly 
four amendments a year. This has triggered the same number of changes in 
local ordinances and in implementation decrees for 3,200 local governments. 
The situation is much the same for the Child Protection Act (Act XXXI. of 
1997 on the protection of children and the custodial administration), which 
has been amended 41 times in 12 years, and the Family Support Act (Act 
LXXXIB of 1998) which had been amended 29 times in 10 years (Erdõs, 
2010). No one can keep up with this deluge of amendments, triggering a good 
number of unlawful consequences. Among other things, it is impossible to at-
tach this vast number of amendments to every copy of the law in print, which 
means that legal actions are certain to be full of contradictions. The legislation 
itself gives rise to uncertainties. Each year the law governing the budget can 
amend the amount of cash benefits involved. For instance, each year a deci-
sion is taken on whether to peg benefits to other payments such as pensions or 
leave them floating, and whether to tax them or not. The law that establishes 
the budget can also alter the rules of eligibility for the various services and 
the financing conditions, annually should it wish to. This unpredictability not 
only hurts the quality of legal regulation and administration, but it is also a 
serious blow to families who have no way of knowing whether they can count 
on child-care assistance, paid child-care leave for working mothers, family 
allowances or anything else (since elections in April 2010, the new adminis-
tration has been passing legislative amendments at breakneck speed, too).
Examples of disregarding the facts are the family allowance, the Road to 
Work program, and the helter-skelter and thoughtless way of shifting cash 
benefits to benefits in kind. Let me focus on the family allowance. We know 
for certain from all domestic and international descriptions and data that the 
universal benefit, meaning an across-the-board family allowance granted to 
every single child, is the most effective way of countering poverty. The cost 
of transferring this benefit to all families is low, the take-up rate is almost 100 
per cent, a rate never approached by assistance schemes, and it can even be 
calibrated to family situation and/or the age of the child. Despite this, con-
stant demands on the part of Hungarian liberals, and more recently of the 
new “Hungarian conservatives”, are that family allowances be limited to low-
income families, that they be taxed, that tax cuts would be a better idea, or 
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that they be linked to various conditions such as school attendance. The idea 
of abolishing the universal family allowance has been repeatedly proposed 
and rejected over the last two decades. In principle there was always one 
condition, regular school attendance: if a child was consistently missing from 
school, the parent would have been fined or even incarcerated. This happened 
very seldom, though – public administration knew that most of the families 
were unable to pay fines and incarceration seemed too extreme. Under a new 
law adopted in June 2010, the family allowance has been renamed. For chil-
dren under six years of age it is now called an “educational benefit”, while for 
children over six it has become a “school attendance allowance”. If a child 
over 6 misses over 50 hours of classes and has no medical or other explana-
tion, the school attendance allowance is suspended for 6 months. It depends 
on the local authority whether the family can get an equivalent amount in 
kind through the ministrations of the child protection agency, starting with the 
second month of the suspension. In their haste to introduce the sanction, the 
new government made no attempt to collect facts or to understand the mecha-
nisms or causes of truancy. There is no evidence to tell us how widespread 
truancy actually is, only conjectures suggesting that the phenomenon occurs 
often among the over-14, and is most common in non-academic secondary 
schools (schools for learning trades). Therefore there are no studies about the 
possible impact of the new measure. There has been no attempt  to determine 
either why children who were never liked by the school or who were never 
offered any help or encouragement, tend to play hooky, nor did the legislators 
consider that reducing the income of a family that is poor at the outset will in 
all likelihood enhance all norm-violating behaviors.
I will demonstrate ineffectiveness using one of the key objectives of the 
education system, desegregation, showing how it went awry. Since the early 
2000s a great deal of effort has gone into reducing the level of segregation. A 
variety of financial incentives were introduced in successive order (offering 
among other funds, normative support for integration) as were administrative 
prescriptions demanding integration. There was no monitoring of what hap-
pened to the financial incentives, and though the funds have been used, the 
effects were dubious. Schools and bodies maintaining the schools managed 
to find loopholes enabling them to satisfy requirements on paper while actu-
ally reinforcing segregation (for instance, schools were merged to produce 
improvement in the overall ratios of the school and the averages covered up 
continued segregation in the newly merged schools whose ethnic composition 
remained unchanged). Outstanding among the administrative measures was 
the altering of school-district boundaries. The new law introduced in Janu-
ary 2007 required children to attend their district school, eliminating the free 
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school choice that had led to widespread segregation. The new law was not 
preceded by any measure of preparation and there was no dialogue with par-
ents, teachers, or children. It should not surprise anyone that the law remained 
toothless. The children “moved” to addresses in the school zone of choice, 
or families actually moved, or in a worst case scenario they founded private 
schools. A recent analysis by Gábor Kertesi and Gábor Kézdi (2010) based 
on a complete set of longitudinal data, drew the painful conclusion that while 
between 1980 and 1990 there was no change in the segregation of Gypsy 
children in school, from 1990 onwards segregation grew significantly, year 
on year. If Julia Szalai is right and school segregation is doing an excellent job 
of performing a latent function – legitimizing the wall between deep poverty 
and the non-poor by making separation the rule rather than the exception and 
thus expanding the isolated childhood way of life into lifelong isolation – a 
halt to and reversal of current processes would require overall social change 
and not “targeted aid to the poor” (Szalai 2010). 
By political populism, I mean that politics adjusts to what it thinks it hears 
as “the will of the people.” Irresponsible promises of increasing distribution 
are just as populist as decrees that yield to prejudice or racism, because the 
politician or political party expects them to boost their popularity. Populist 
promises have been a part of the campaign strategy of just about every single 
political party before every election. Populism that yields to divisive views – 
anti-poverty, anti-Gypsy, chauvinist – was originally limited to the right wing. 
However, in the past year or two every single political party has become pop-
ulist in both senses and every one of them has its racists (who in many cases 
indignantly reject this qualifier). 
The popular “demand” for racism
Racism is spreading. It is helped by prejudice that is reinforced by myths 
presented as facts (with strong media support). Myths generally have some 
root in history or experience and are then expanded to the point where they 
become mistaken for reality in general. The allegations that distort reality 
and shape general attitudes towards the poor might be true for a fraction of 
the group. Generalization of the myth makes it appear that the objectionable 
behavior is typical of every single poor person. This gives rise to the stere-
otypes: “these people” do not like, do not want, do not know how to work; 
“these people” spend taxpayer money on themselves, not their children; 
“these people” drive Mercedes-Benzes and wear gold chains when picking 
up their assistance - in other words, they are cheaters -; or “these people” have 
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children just to get the family allowance. Some of these legends are worded 
to mean “Gypsy” so that, for instance, the expression, “Gypsy crime” has 
become widely accepted. This is how poverty is turned into a Gypsy matter, 
which leads to an even sharper rejection of any assistance. The most recent 
addendum to these legends, which has been voiced by socialist politicians, 
conservatives, and even a leading gynecologist, is: “these people/mothers” 
use medication or rubber mallets to deliberately disable their unborn children 
to get a higher level of family allowance. This myth differs from the others in 
a number of ways. First of all, it does not contain even a grain of truth. No one 
has been able to cite a single case where this has happened. Instead everyone 
who espouses this tale heard it from someone else who heard it from some-
one. And if someone should name a village, the responsible village elders 
and the involved parties alike are bewildered by the charges and helplessly 
protest. Reliable researchers argue that there is no way anyone can come up 
with a concrete case because a foetus cannot be injured to cause specific dis-
abilities with the methods cited. The charges are particularly cruel because of 
the undercurrent of ritual slaughter. They hint at the deliberate damaging of 
one of the holiest of values, the unborn child, and as such the legend is par-
ticularly good at stirring up a firestorm. Acceptance of this legend exempts 
the political world from having to do anything to counter the conditions that 
really do lead to the birth of so many low birth-weight infants at the poor end 
of the spectrum or from doing anything to encourage more deliberate “family 
planning”. 
These myths legitimize the existing laws and the ones on the planning board 
that restrict the rights of the poor and completely deny them their dignity. 
New regulations and laws-to-be are reintroducing the requirement to perform 
senseless work, are limiting freedom of consumption and are interfering (con-
sidered the right of the taxpayers) in every corner of their private lives. One of 
the recent exploits of a mayor (and Member of Parliament) is the publication 
(in July 2010) on the internet of a list of names (complete with birth dates) of 
‘cheaters’ whose criminal offence is that they did not pick up the free meal or 
the food parcel they applied for and hence “squandered taxpayers’ money”. 
This Wall of Shame has been warmly approved of by government. Another 
proposal made also by an MP in October 2009 aims at the introduction of a 
“social welfare card”. All assistance money should be transferred to the card 
which would only be used to purchase basic necessities in designated shops. 
The goal is “to establish a fair, targeted, and transparent assistance system”. 
The argument in favor of it was given thus: “When a system is supported and 
maintained by taxpayer money, an absolute requirement is that beneficiar-
ies truly spend the government benefits to cover the needs of the family and 
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the children. There is a real danger with the current cash payment system 
that a portion of social support may be spent on unhealthy luxury consumer 
goods (i.e. tobacco and alcohol), gaming machines or may wander into the 
hands of loan sharks, rather than going for food, clothing and home mainte-
nance”. These allegations, declaring everyone a suspect, and therefore subject 
to collective punishment, are, to put it mildly, mistaken. They also suggest a 
’civilization gap’. Elizabeth Gaskell’s genre novella, My Lady Ludlow was 
published in 1858. In it one of her characters visits the poor and “…she asked 
too many home questions (not to say impertinent) concerning their domestic 
economies (for even the very poor liked to spend their bit of money their own 
way), and would open cupboards to find hidden extravagances…” (Elizabeth 
Gaskell, 1995, p. 160). Every single research study in Hungary has found 
that in poor and non-poor families alike, in the vast majority of families – 
well over 90 percent – “children come first.” If they are hungry the reason is 
almost always a lack of money. The reason there is a lack of money is a lack 
of work, a low level of assistance, and usurial interest rates. Now, nobody 
borrows money at usury rates for sheer pleasure. They do it because there is 
something they absolutely must have money for – to pay an urgent bill, to pay 
interest on another loan, to buy medicine, or to buy bread. It makes one won-
der how people will be protected from predatory lenders if they have even less 
cash at their disposal.
The fight against racism has been severally put back on the political agen-
da. Yet, public funding and political will have always remained insufficient, 
and the awareness of civil society has been weak. Anti-poor emotions have 
triggered a situation in which the political class believes that people are de-
manding populist measures. One factor feeding the populism is a growing 
anti-Gypsy mood, and increasingly barefaced racism. Hatred of the Gypsies 
has been growing as have provocative actions that threaten them, such as 
marches through villages with a high Gypsy population organized by the far-
right Hungarian Guard. The government’s populist measures proved inca-
pable of preventing the far right from becoming stronger. The Jobbik (right 
wing) Party (with close connections to the Hungarian Guard movement) won 
seats in Parliament in 2010. 
How the poor have responded to the situation
When things happen gradually the boundaries of the impossible and in-
conceivable are gradually stretched. Today’s ghettos of poverty would have 
been unimaginable even less than twenty years ago. Granted, the beginning, 
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the loss of jobs, hit with the suddenness of a blow to the solar plexus, but that 
was followed by gradual deterioration. A person can get used to just about 
anything. It would be easy to explain the “ease” of adjustment to the changes 
using the concept of habitus as used by P. Bourdieu. But there is more than 
one way of interpreting habitus. We also need to consider differences in the 
life situations of successive generations, marked by very different historical 
experiences that have become their “habitus”.
People who were thirty years old or more at the time of the regime change 
had presumably evolved a habitus shaped by hard but predictably regular 
work and security, albeit of a low level. The new conditions were completely 
different than the ones which shaped that habitus. So it is not really surpris-
ing that people who never had the chance to reflect on or evaluate their own 
behavior and habits – people with a low level of education whose tenuous 
hold on the labor market was broken – drifted off uncontrollably into situ-
ations they were unable to handle, or thought out new survival strategies 
which offered only momentary respite (such as borrowing money from loan 
sharks). People in better situations, particularly if they were able to hold on to 
(comparatively) secure jobs, may have continued their lives without needing 
to adjust their former habitus to new conditions. In other cases people with 
more cultural and other capital were able to form a “reflexive” relationship 
to their own habitus and change their whole course of life without too much 
difficulty. The fate of people born and socialized into the new regime depends 
increasingly on their family circumstances. If they are fortunate, they may 
choose any course in life and maintain better control over their own destinies 
than previous generations. On the other end of the social scale, people often 
become heirs to a new type of deep poverty. For some of the young people the 
world has become much more open, while for others it is far more closed. 
Possible responses to totally new situations irresolvable due to ingrained 
habitus are the collapse of the family, turning over of the children over to state 
care, crime, or the complete crumbling of self and vegetation until physical 
death. Given the ethnic coloration of the veneer that coats poverty, a growing 
portion of society (possibly the majority) views this as a “Gypsy question”. 
Granted, in the most disadvantaged micro-regions (for which we have 2009 
data) 70 percent of the Gypsies and “only” 30 percent of the non-Gypsies are 
poor. However, given that the Gypsies make up a minority of the population, 
fully half of the poor even in these micro-regions are not Roma at all. 
In principle local efforts may sometimes be helpful even without central 
dispositions. In some cases a devoted mayor and other dedicated profession-
als in a settlement with a measure of grant money can try to improve the situ-
ation and bring change to local residents including poor and Gypsy residents 
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(this can occur through local implementation of the National Strategy against 
Child Poverty adopted by Parliament in 2007, which got underway in one 
micro-region and later spread to another dozen of them, using local resources 
and the European Social Fund). For the moment this is the exception rather 
than the rule. Individuals who manage to beat the odds are also exceptions. 
If someone in a remote village where there are no jobs has a family it is well 
nigh impossible to leave them behind and go off to seek one’s fortune. The 
family would starve. Moving the whole family is out of the question because 
there is no local market for selling the house and it is impossible to find af-
fordable housing in a town. 
It is hard to tell how long the poor will tolerate and be resigned to this de-
terioration of their lives into hopelessness. It will depend on how bad things 
get and on the tolerance of their surroundings. Momentarily dormant conflicts 
could easily trigger open conflicts, even individual or collective uprisings. 
However, any major escalation in resistance is bound to be thwarted by the 
isolation of the villages where the poor and the Gypsies live, and by their lack 
of organization and tools. Yet, unless contemporary problems such as rac-
ism, segregation, ghettoization and overall intolerance are remedied, social 
sustainability and social cohesion will be seriously threatened on an ongoing 
basis. If civil society were able to raise its feelings of solidarity, concerns 
could be alleviated. However, even then, the state – despite its very limited 
scope for maneuvering – should find the resources to begin to mitigate these 
problems in a tangible way. Whether it will recognize and accept this respon-
sibility remains a key question. 
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